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In many ways, Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) arti-
cle on multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approaches 
to construct validity has stood like a Platonic ideal 
for personality psychologists since its publication. In 
the ideal study, and scientific world, our constructs 
should converge in a robust and coherent fashion 
across diverse methods. Moreover, we should all as-
pire to use multiple methods in both validating our 
measures and in investigating our ideas. Interest-
ingly, that Platonic ideal is not realized as often as 
expected. If one looks closely at the empirical litera-
ture in personality psychology, the expectation that 
abstract constructs should converge across methods 
is seldom met at the level implied in the original ar-
ticle. This is not to argue that the Platonic ideal is 
not appropriate. Rather, one of the major points we 
would like to make in this chapter is that the ideal of 
the MTMM approach is often taken too literally and 
is sometimes misused or misinterpreted. Why speak 
such apostasies? In large part, because we are mo-
tivated to reiterate points made, ironically, by Fiske 
himself (Fiske, 1971). 
What are these points? The first is that different 
methods, or modes as Fiske (1971) described them, 
are seldom innocuous. Thus, the literal assump-
tion drawn from Campbell and Fiske (1959) that 
measures of similar constructs drawn from differ-
ent methods should converge quite robustly is not 
met as often as we would like. This can lead to er-
roneous and nihilistic conclusions, such as the con-
struct of interest, like depression, does not exist 
(e.g., Lewis, 1999). The second point is the assump-
tion that monomethod studies are problematic, in-
adequate, and should be avoided at all costs. Or, 
conversely, we should all be doing multimethod 
studies. This directive fails to consider the empiri-
cal I fact just mentioned, which is that measures of 
the same construct seldom correlate highly enough 
across methods to warrant averaging across meth-
ods (Fiske, 1971). What are needed, rather than 
mandates to perform multimethod studies, are the-
oretical models that successfully incorporate and 
explain both the overlap and lack thereof of identi-
cal constructs across methods. In our following re-
view, we will attempt to highlight the few theories 
and empirical examples that have done so. 
Our third point is that the focus on multiple 
methods has inadvertently led to a misguided 
boondoggle to search for the methodological holy 
grail—the one method that deserves our ultimate 
attention. Campbell and Fiske (1959) should not be 
saddled with full responsibility for this phenome-
non beyond the fact that they made it clear that we 
should be pursuing multiple methods. Leave it to 
human nature that psychologists would take that 
idea and try to one up the multimethod approach 
by finding the ultimate method. Thus, we have 
had hyperbolic statements made for and against 
particular methods made since the 1960s. People 
have argued that self-reports are fundamentally 
flawed and indistinguishable from response styles 
(Hogan & Nicholson, 1988; Rorer, 1965), that ob-
server ratings are the seat of personality psychol-
ogy (Hofstee, 1994), that projective tests do not 
work (Dawes, 1994), and that we should prioritize 
online measures over all other techniques (Kahn-
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eman, 1999). As will be seen in the following re-
views, none of these positions is defensible. 
As the methods used are often tied inextricably 
to the ideas in a field, we will first provide a work-
ing definition of the field of personality psychology 
that will serve as an organizing heuristic for the 
subsequent review. As will be seen, this is a true 
case of form following function, as the content cate-
gories within the field of personality are each dom-
inated by specific methods. Then, we review recent 
multimethod studies within and across the con-
tent domains of personality psychology. We will 
end with some thoughts about particulars of multi-
method approaches in personality psychology. 
WHAT IS PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY? 
Personality psychology is the study of the indi-
vidual differences in traits, motives, abilities, and 
life stories that make each individual unique (Rob-
erts & Wood, in press). Figure 1 depicts the pri-
mary units of focus in our definition of personality, 
which reflects what we describe as the neosocioan-
alytic perspective on personality. For the purposes 
of this chapter, we will focus on the left-hand por-
tion of the model and forgo a discussion of social 
roles and culture, so as to focus on the traditional 
content and methods of personality psychology. 
As can be seen in Figure 1 there are four “units of 
analysis” or domains that make up the core of per-
sonality: traits, motives, abilities, and narratives. 
These four domains are intended to subsume most, 
if not all, of the broad categories of individual dif-
ferences in personality psychology. 
The first domain, traits, subsumes the enduring 
patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that 
distinguish people from one another. Or, more eu-
phemistically speaking, traits refer to what people 
typically think, feel, or do. In this regard, we view 
traits from a neo-Allportian perspective (Funder, 
1991). From this perspective, traits are real, not fic-
tions of people’s semantic memory. They are causal, 
not just summaries of behavior. Moreover, they are 
learned. Even with identical genetically determined 
temperaments, two individuals may manifest dif-
ferent traits because of their unique life experiences. 
Much attention has been dedicated to finding a 
working taxonomy of traits, and many accept the 
Big Five as a minimal number of domains (Gold-
berg, 1993). We prefer the Big Seven (Benet-Mar-
tinez & Waller, 1997). The Big Seven adds global 
positive and negative evaluation to the Big Five 
and is a better representation of the entire trait do-
main. We prefer this model because, as will be seen 
later, one distinct characteristic of our definition of 
personality is the inclusion of reputation as a key 
element that has been underemphasized in the 
field. And although people may not describe them-
selves often with terms such as “evil” or “stun-
ning,” they do describe others in these terms. 
Motivation, broadly construed, is the second do-
main of personality and subsumes all the things 
that people feel are desirable. We define the domain 
of motives as what people desire, need, and strive 
for-or perhaps more simply, what people want to 
do. This category includes values, interests, prefer-
ences, and goals (e.g., Holland, 1997), in addition to 
the classic notion of motives and needs (e.g., Mur-
ray, 1938). Currently, this domain is less coherent 
than the trait domain because there is no working 
taxonomy to organize the units of analysis. None-
theless, there are striking commonalities across di-
verse areas, such as motives, goals, values, and in-
terests. For example, in each of these domains of 
motivation, one can find superordinate themes of 
agency (desire for status and power) and commu-
nion (desire for acceptance and belonging). So, for 
example, the primary motivational units have been 
achievement, power (agency) and affiliation (com-
munion; Smith, 1992). The higher-order factors that 
subsume most value dimensions also reflect power 
and affiliation (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). 
The third domain reflects abilities and the hier-
archical models identified in achievement litera-
tures-that is what people can do (Lubinski, 2000). 
Specifically, intelligence is an individual’s “entire 
repertoire of acquired skills, knowledge, learning 
sets, and generalization tendencies considered in-
tellectual in nature that [is] available at any one 
period of time” (Humphreys, 1984, p. 243). Two 
models of abilities prevail. The first decomposes 
generalized intelligence (g), into constituent el-
ements of verbal, quantitative, and spatial abili-
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ties. The second decomposes g into two domains 
of fluid and crystallized intelligence (Horn & Cat-
tell, 1966). The most radical feature of our system 
is that individual differences in ability should be 
a primary focus of personality researchers. How 
people differ on abilities is clearly important from 
both pragmatic and theoretical perspectives, and 
any description of an individual life would be in-
adequate if it were not included. 
The final domain focuses on the content of per-
sonal stories and narratives that people use to un-
derstand themselves and their environments (Mc-
Adams, 1993). A critical point to consider in any 
model of personality is that although individu-
als can be classified in terms of traits, abilities, and 
goals, they often (if not generally) communicate in-
formation about themselves quite differently than 
a simple nomothetic classification on these charac-
teristics, and one common strategy is the use of il-
lustrative stories (McAdams, 1993) or scripts (de St. 
Aubin, 1999). People find it very easy to tell stories 
about themselves, others, and their environments. 
These narratives in turn help people create mean-
ing and purpose in their lives and, predictability, 
in the events they observe and experience and pro-
vide explanations of how people have come to be 
in their present circumstances. 
The identification of these four domains is cur-
sory and deserves greater attention. Nonetheless, 
we feel that this is a sufficient start to organiz-
ing the units of analysis found within personality 
psychology and, more clearly than other systems, 
identifies what we study and, in part, the methods 
we use to study individuals. 
Figure 1. A neo-socioanalytic topographical model of personality psychology. 
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Personality Is a Multilevel Phenomenon 
A key component of our neosocioanalytic per-
spective on personality is that the domains of traits, 
motives, abilities, and narratives can be differenti-
ated in hierarchical terms (see Hooker, 2002; Hooker 
& McAdams, 2003; Mayer, 1995; Roberts & Pomer-
antz, in press). For example, at the broadest level 
of the trait domain one finds the personality traits 
found in standard omnibus personality invento-
ries. These are often the traits that make up the now 
ubiquitous measures of the Big Five. The midlevel 
of the continuum can be conceptualized by narrow 
traits, such as the subfacets of the Big Five (Rob-
erts, Bogg, Walton, Chernyshenko, & Stark, 2004). 
These constructs are broader than discrete behav-
iors but less broad than traits, as they are often con-
strained to specific roles and interpersonal contexts 
(e.g., relationships, work, and friendships). Pre-
sumably, these midlevel constructs are more stable 
than discrete behaviors and less stable than broad 
traits (e.g., Conley, 1984). At the most narrow level, 
we find the constituent elements of traits: thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors. So, for example, one can be 
a depressed person, indicating a broad generaliz-
able pattern of depressed affect across time and situ-
ation, yet experience different daily moods or states 
that do not correspond directly to one’s trait level. 
The hierarchical structuring of each domain of 
personality adds another layer of methods on top 
of the methods typically identified within person-
ality psychology (see following). So, not only can 
one assess personality through global ratings of 
personality traits, but also through daily mood rat-
ings or frequencies of behaviors. Or, similarly, one 
could assess a person’s motivations through broad 
ratings of values and interests or the relevant ac-
tions they take in their lives, such as exercising and 
eating well as, manifestations of valuing health. 
The information gleaned from these different lev-
els constitutes different methods that are partially 
overlapping, yet distinct in important ways. 
The Methodological and Conceptual Fulcrum: 
Identity and Reputation 
According to our conceptualization of personal-
ity, the components of personality are manifest in 
two psychological media: the identity and the rep-
utation. Identity reflects the sum total of opinions 
that are cognitively available to a person across the 
four units of analysis described earlier. We use the 
term identity for several reasons. The most impor-
tant reason is the fact that identity pertains to both 
the content of self-perceptions and the meta-cog-
nitive perception of those same self-perceptions. 
Specifically, people can simultaneously see them-
selves as “outgoing” and a “carpenter” and feel 
more or less confident about those self-perceptions. 
Or, people can see themselves as agreeable (self-
percept) and at the same time see their agreeable-
ness as changeable or not (meta-cognitive percept). 
These latter metacognitive aspects of identity, re-
flected in constructs such as entity versus incre-
mental orientation (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), iden-
tity achievement, identity clarity, and importance, 
play a significant role in personality assessment 
and development (Roberts & Caspi, 2003). 
Reputation is others’ perspectives about a per-
son’s traits, motives, abilities, and narratives 
(Craik, 1993). There is a tendency to consider ob-
server ratings, or in this case, reputational ratings, 
as higher quality than self-reports (Hofstee, 1994). 
This position holds some merit, as a good assess-
ment of a person’s reputation entails asking the 
opinion of more than one person. Thus, reputa-
tional ratings, by their very nature, are often in-
trinsically more reliable than self-reports because 
self-reports only entail the opinion of one person. 
Reputations also guide significant decisions, such 
as whether to hire a person, admit them to gradu-
ate school, marry them, or simply be their friend. 
From our perspective, the self-reports used to 
assess identity and the observer ratings used to as-
sess reputation both afford unique, yet flawed, in-
formation about a person. Certain psychological 
phenomena, such as feelings of anxiety, may best 
be accessed through self-reports of identity On 
the other hand, determining a person’s true levels 
of agreeableness might be better assessed through 
the opinion of their friends and relatives who 
may be less defensive about another person’s be-
havior than their own. Each perspective is poten-
tially defective, in that neither the persons report-
ing on themselves nor the persons reporting on a 
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friend or relative are perfectly accurate. Accepting 
the fact that there are two flawed and distinct ways 
to understand a person confronts and solves sev-
eral dilemmas that have plagued personality psy-
chology for decades. For example, it automatically 
incorporates the fact that people can and do at-
tempt to manage their identity to shape their rep-
utation. People do not always tell the whole truth 
about themselves to employers, friends, family, 
and strangers. Self-presentation is a fact in human 
nature and must be successfully incorporated into 
any theory of personality and cannot be incorpo-
rated without a distinction between identity and 
reputation (Hogan & Roberts, 2000). 
Despite the spirit of the MTMM approach 
spelled out by Campbell and Fiske (1959), the con-
vergence of self-reports and observer ratings of 
personality and other phenomena has never been 
as high as one would hope. In most cases, the con-
vergence averages between .3 and .6 (Funder, 
1987). One of the clear conceptual and method-
ological advances in the field of personality psy-
chology is the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM; 
Funder, 1995), which provides a clear theoreti-
cal model identifying why identity and reputa-
tion are not more highly correlated. In this model, 
for a strong tie to exist between self-reports and 
observer ratings four conditions must hold. First, 
the person being perceived must do something 
relevant to the psychological dimension of inter-
est. If one wants to judge whether a person is con-
scientious or not, then it is imperative that they 
act in a conscientious fashion. Second, the behav-
ior, thought, or feeling must be displayed in a 
way that it is made available to the observer. Like 
the proverbial tree falling in an empty forest, pri-
vate actions do little to influence one’s reputation, 
unless of course they are made public. Third, the 
observer must detect the behavior. If the person 
watching does not perceive the behavior, then it 
might as well not have occurred. Finally, the ob-
served act must be used in an appropriate way. 
For example, to some people, being clean may be 
a sign of conscientiousness, whereas to others it 
may be an indication of neuroticism (e.g., obses-
siveness). The extent to which these four condi-
tions hold determines the level of correspondence 
between self and observers across psychological 
domains. 
The RAM model has implications beyond the re-
lationship between observer/reputation and self-
reports/identity. It also applies to the accuracy of 
self-reports themselves, in the absence of any ob-
server data. For example, we often ask young peo-
ple to rate themselves on a variety of personality 
dimensions without ever asking ourselves whether 
these individuals make good judges of their own 
personality. For example, a young person may 
be more than willing to say that they are a good 
leader, based not on experience but on the hope 
that someday they will become one (relevance). Or, 
quite possibly, a person may do something rele-
vant to a trait but not notice it (detection). That is 
to say, people may not be aware of the importance 
or relevance of the diagnostic nature of their own 
behavior. Finally, people may use self-relevant in-
formation in idiosyncratic ways that might not 
conform to how scientists define or understand a 
nomothetically derived construct. With the excep-
tion of the availability stage of the RAM model, it 
seems that the remaining mechanisms for accuracy 
can be applied to a number of issues across psy-
chology and personality psychology in particular. 
Measures of identity and reputation also do not 
correlate as high as expected because they are as-
sessed through distinct methods that afford dif-
ferent types of information (see Meyer et al., 
2001). Clearly, identity-related assessments per-
mit greater access to internal states and experi-
ences that do not happen or are not visible in the 
company of others. Reputations, on the other hand, 
may be less tarnished with self-enhancement ten-
dencies and provide a more objective profile of 
the information that is publicly available to peo-
ple or experts (Hofstee, 1994). Reputational infor-
mation may not be ideal because its validity is un-
dermined by the fact that observers do not have 
complete access to a person’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors (Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000), al-
though conversely, individuals may be unaware of 
some of their own behavioral tendencies that im-
pact their reputations. Using both identity and rep-
utational information and understanding their 
relationship is paramount for the science of per-
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sonality. We will find that the distinction between 
identity and reputation runs through each of the 
domains of personality psychology and often acts 
as a fulcrum for understanding multimethod stud-
ies in personality psychology. 
The methods found within the categories of iden-
tity and reputation can be further divided into the 
set of methods that have historically dominated 
the field of personality psychology. Broadly speak-
ing, methods of assessment in personality psychol-
ogy can be organized around the acronym “LOTS” 
(Block, 1993). L stands for life data, or the narrative 
content of a person’s life. O stands for observer data, 
which can come from peers as well as trained pro-
fessionals. T stands for test data and typically re-
flects objective performance measures. And finally, 
S stands for self-reports, or the subjective inferences 
we have about ourselves. Typically, S and L data are 
acquired through self-report techniques of ratings 
or interviews. T and O data are acquired through 
observer reports because the tests typically have to 
be scored by computer or person, and observer rat-
ings clearly must be acquired through peers, family 
members, or interviewers. These four approaches 
to assessment subsume the majority of the method-
ological efforts in personality psychology. 
MULTIPLE METHODS WITHIN THE  
NEOSOCIOANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
OF PERSONALITY 
A more complete conceptualization of personal-
ity psychology points to many ways in which mul-
tiple methods can be brought to bear on the study 
of personality. First, within each domain of traits, 
motives, abilities, and narratives there are rich 
methodological traditions and differences. So, for 
example, traits have often been assessed using self-
reports of typical behaviors. Similarly, motives and 
goals have been assessed from the perspective of 
the person (e.g., S data) and the psychologist who 
interprets a projective test such as the TAT (e.g., 
O data). Cognitive ability has been traditionally 
assessed through tests of maximal performance 
(e.g., T data), but can also be assessed via self-re-
ports. In contrast, the narrative approach focuses 
on open-ended interviews, written responses, or 
biographical documents to understand individ-
ual differences (e.g., L data). The field of person-
ality typically utilizes diverse methods in an at-
tempt to understand how individuals differ from 
one another. This also makes studies that combine 
assessments from each of these disparate domains 
intrinsically multimethod studies. We highlight ex-
amples of these types of studies from each domain. 
There are more traditional multimethod ap-
proaches within each domain of personality. For 
example, within the domain of personality traits, 
evaluating the efficacy of self-reports and observer 
ratings has been a constant struggle for several de-
cades. Within the motives domain a long-standing 
controversy has been whether to assess motives us-
ing implicit or explicit techniques. We will high-
light studies within each domain that have endeav-
ored to use more than one method within domain. 
Multiple Methods and Personality Traits 
As we noted, one of the persistent disputes in 
personality psychology is between those who be-
lieve that self-reports or observer methods should 
hold priority in the field. The programmatic efforts 
of David Funder and his colleagues demonstrate 
that multiple methods bring multiple perspectives 
to our efforts to understand the behavioral mani-
festation of personality traits. For example, people 
judging the behaviors of others perceive different 
cues as more relevant to personality than the indi-
viduals themselves (Funder & Sneed, 1993). 
In other studies, the usefulness of self- and ob-
server ratings of personality have been tested across 
a variety of domains, including predicting behavior, 
emotions, and personal negativity. The key to test-
ing the utility of different methods is separating the 
perspectives of self and observer from the criterion 
of interest. To do this, Kolar, Funder, and Colvin 
(1996) set up a study in which the participants pro-
vided self-report personality ratings, close acquain-
tances provided an additional set of personality rat-
ings, and the behavior of participants was coded 
from videotaped interactions. Thus, the two sets of 
predictors and criteria did not suffer from meth-
odological overlap. For behavior in a typical social 
setting, such as meeting a stranger or having a dis-
cussion, observer ratings tended to predict behav-
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ior better than self-reports (Kolar, Funder, & Colvin, 
1996). For example, the correlation between self-re-
ported tendency to initiate humor and actual behav-
ior of initiating humor was .09. In contrast, a com-
posite of the rating of the participants’ tendency to 
initiate humor of two close acquaintances correlated 
.23 (p < .05) with actual behavior. Clearly, what we 
believe to be a joke is not perceived by others to be 
funny, which might explain why more people don’t 
laugh at our jokes. 
Spain et al. (2000) used a similar design to both 
replicate Kolar et al. (1996) and extend the design to 
see if self-reports might be superior in specific set-
tings, such as when one is predicting emotion rather 
than behavior. Consistent with expectations, self-re-
ported personality ratings were more strongly re-
lated to experience sampling assessments of emo-
tion than observer ratings of personality traits. This 
presumably derives from the fact that emotions are 
internal events that are not always shared with oth-
ers as overt, visible behaviors. Their private nature 
makes them a natural target for self-reports rather 
than observer ratings. Interestingly, self-reported 
personality ratings did better than observer ratings 
of personality in predicting social interactions. For 
example, self-reported extraversion was correlated 
with demonstrating social skills, as judged by a set 
of trained raters, whereas a composite of acquain-
tance ratings was essentially uncorrelated with the 
same behavior. In fact, for extraversion, self-reports 
were twice as good as observer ratings of extraver-
sion in predicting behaviors. 
Clearly, based on this research alone, we cannot 
make any strong generalizations about the supe-
riority of self-reports and observer ratings of per-
sonality This is itself important, as it undermines 
claims that any given perspective is superior. Stud-
ies that actually use multiple methods arrive at 
more equivocal conclusions. This point is driven 
home conceptually in a review of the utility of psy-
chological assessment (Meyer et al., 2001). In de-
scribing the importance of using multiple meth-
ods of personality assessment in clinical settings, 
Meyer et al. (2001) argued that each method af-
fords a clinician, and by default a researcher, infor-
mation that may not be strongly overlapping, yet 
still quite valid. That is to say that asking parents 
about a child’s depression may not result in high 
agreement with the child’s assessment (e.g., Lewis, 
1999). Rather than seeing this as an indictment of 
either perspective or the construct of interest, we 
should use both of these perspectives and more 
(e.g., teachers, peers, siblings) to gauge the nature 
and progress of the phenomenon. For example, a 
child may have effectively hidden depression from 
his or her parents, but not hidden the same phe-
nomena from his or her peers. The discrepancy it-
self may be both interesting and relevant to the 
experience of depression, as it might reflect alien-
ation and disengagement from parents that might 
be a contributing factor to the depression. 
The perspective that no single method holds pri-
ority extends to arguments against the use of pro-
jective measures (Dawes, 1994). For example, in 
our meta-analysis of the longitudinal consistency 
of personality trait measures (Roberts & DelVec-
chio, 2000), we found that projective measures of 
personality traits were as consistent as observer 
and self-report methods of personality assessment. 
Moreover, in particular cases, projective measures 
outperform other methods, such as in the assess-
ment of dependency (Bornstein, 1999). This does 
not to provide a ringing endorsement for projec-
tive tests, as it is clear that specific projective tests 
and particular measures derived from projective 
tests do not demonstrate adequate reliability and 
validity (Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2000). None-
theless, blanket statements that they should not be 
used are not warranted given the evidence. 
The idea that perspectives that differ in terms of 
their hierarchical relationship to personality pro-
vide different, yet equally valid information was 
demonstrated nicely by a recent study of satisfac-
tion with one’s vacation (Wirtz, Kruger, Napa-
Scollon, & Diener, 2003). In this study, participants 
rated how satisfied they thought they would be 
with an upcoming vacation. In addition, they com-
pleted an online assessment of their emotional ex-
periences during the vacation using experience-
sampling methods. A week later, they rated how 
satisfied they were with their vacation. Interest-
ingly, anticipated and retrospective ratings of sat-
isfaction were much higher than online ratings of 
satisfaction, indicating a slight disjoint between 
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actual experience and higher-order evaluations 
of that same experience. Moreover, the different 
methods yielded different information. The online 
experiences were strong predictors of the retro-
spective ratings of satisfaction, which were in turn 
the most important predictor of wanting to go on a 
similar vacation in the future. The effect of actual 
experience on the desire to go on a similar vacation 
was entirely mediated by the higher-order gener-
alizations about satisfaction, which indicates that 
the different methods yielded complementary in-
formation rather than redundant information. This 
study counters the argument that online assess-
ments should be prioritized over broader, some-
times retrospective reports of personality (e.g., 
Kahneman, 1999), as it was the global self-reports 
that predicted long-term intentions rather than di-
rect, behavioral measures of experience. 
Within the trait domain, we find many of the 
classic arguments about multiple methods, such 
as the utility of self-reports versus other ratings 
and newer perspectives manifest in assessing per-
sonality across multiple levels of breadth or across 
different contexts. Consistent with the neosocio-
analytic framework that a differentiated conceptu-
alization of personality leads to a multimethod ap-
proach, each of these different methods revealed 
complementary and useful information. What we 
still lack, of course, are theoretical systems to ac-
count for the complementary rather than overlap-
ping nature of the information gleaned from dif-
ferent methods. Systems like the RAM model are 
a step in the right direction, but more conceptual 
and theoretical work is needed. 
Motives and Goals 
Research in the domain of motives has had two 
major methodological and theoretical schools, 
which address the study of this broader question 
in quite different ways. The first school, the need 
approach to motivation, begins with the assump-
tion that people are often unaware of the funda-
mental forces that motivate their behavior. The sec-
ond major school, the goal approach, attempts to 
understand explicit motives and interests as the 
means to reach a deeper, underlying understand-
ing of motivation. Need theorists believe that mo-
tivation is not accessible through conscious pro-
cesses and that it should be interpreted through 
expert analysis of material generated by a person 
without their knowledge of what is being assessed. 
In contrast, goal theorists have no qualms about as-
sessing goals using conscious processing. 
The need approach to motivation is clearly con-
nected historically to the use of the Thematic Ap-
perception Test (TAT), which was initially devel-
oped by Murray (1938). Following the belief that 
individuals are unaware of their motives and un-
able to report accurately on them, the TAT was de-
signed as a projective technique under the belief 
that “when a person interprets an ambiguous so-
cial situation he is apt to expose his own personal-
ity as much as the phenomenon to which he is at-
tending” (p. 531). These observations together form 
the theoretical basis of the TAT, where participants 
are asked to take the part of story-writers and cre-
ate stories on the basis of ambiguous pictures. Al-
though the traditional TAT paradigm is the one 
most commonly associated with the assessment of 
Murray’s needs, several alternative routes to the as-
sessment of Murray’s needs have been developed. 
For instance, Schmalt (1999) developed a “semi-
projective” grid technique in which individuals are 
asked to rate what characters in TAT-like pictures 
are thinking or feeling from a fixed set of options. 
The second school of thought within the domain 
of motivation is that of the goal approach, which 
begins by asking individuals what they are typi-
cally trying to do in their everyday lives. Whereas 
theorists working within the need approach to mo-
tivation state that behavior is determined largely 
by discrepancies between actual states and uncon-
scious motives, goal theorists believe behavior is 
largely influenced by discrepancies that are con-
sciously accessible (Emmons, 1986, 1989). Further, 
whereas needs are conceptualized as broad, de-
contextualized, and fundamental constructs (Win-
ter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998), goals 
are assumed to vary hierarchically in their level of 
abstraction, ranging from specific and short-term 
goals such as “what I’m currently concerned with 
doing” (Klinger, 1975; Little, 1983), to more-endur-
ing midlevel constructs such as personal strivings 
that reflect “what I’m typically trying to do” (Em-
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mons, 1986) and finally to more broad and long-
term life goals such as establishing a career or find-
ing a relationship partner (Roberts & Robins, 2000). 
Each of these levels is associated with a slightly dif-
ferent method, although generally these methods 
are idiographic, allowing respondents to give open-
ended responses to the instructions and rely on 
conscious acknowledgement of one’s aspirations. 
Consistent with Fiske’s (1971) argument that 
method can have a profound effect on construct 
validity, one of the long-standing controversies 
within the field of motivation is whether implicit 
or explicit methods of assessing motivations as-
sess the same constructs. McClelland, Koestner, 
and Weinberger (1989) argued that measures such 
as the TAT and questionnaire measures such as the 
Jackson PRF are measures of distinct constructs, la-
beled implicit needs and self-attributed needs, re-
spectively. Presumably, implicit measures should 
predict operant behaviors that are relatively un-
controlled by the environmental, such as job level 
attained in organizations and behavior occurring 
under natural conditions (McClelland, 1980). Self-
attributed motives should be more predictive of re-
spondent behaviors, such as school grades, person-
ality, and intelligence tests, where the behavior is 
elicited and constrained by environmental stimuli. 
In a meta-analysis of the literature on achieve-
ment motivation comparing the utility of self-at-
tributed ratings of motives to implicit measures 
of motives, Spangler (1992) found support for this 
hypothesis. Implicit measures were more predic-
tive of outcomes when attaining the outcomes in-
volved challenges or incentives that were intrinsic 
to the task, such as moderate risk and time pres-
sures, whereas self-attributed measures were more 
predictive of performance in tasks that involved 
social incentives, such as challenging goals set up 
by the experimenter or norms that encouraged 
achievement. Interestingly, implicit motives were 
also found to decrease in their relation to task per-
formance when the number of social incentives in-
volved with the task was high. Consistent with the 
interpretation of implicit needs as somewhat akin 
to intrinsic motivation, Spangler suggested that so-
cial incentives may conflict or otherwise suppress 
the effect of implicit needs on performance. 
Recently, research has attempted to form a more 
complete picture of the associations between motive 
measures by looking simultaneously at the mea-
sures used by need and goal theorists. Emmons and 
McAdams (1991) examined the relations between 
the Jackson PRF, personal strivings, and TAT mea-
sures for the assessment of the achievement, affili-
ation, intimacy, and power motivations. The au-
thors found modest relations between matching 
TAT and striving categories for achievement, inti-
macy, and power motives, indicating that, to some 
extent, these methods may be measuring the same 
underlying construct. On the other hand, the self-re-
ported PRF was related to matching dimensions of 
personal strivings for power and achievement mea-
sures, but was irregularly related to the TAT mo-
tives. For instance, self-reported dominance was 
related positively to TAT achievement, but was un-
related to TAT power. The authors concluded that 
personal strivings may lie somewhere between self-
attributed motives and implicit motives in that striv-
ings appeared to relate to the TAT and PRF better 
than these scales relate to each other. 
However, a second study looking at motives for 
power, affiliation, and achievement (King, 1995) 
failed to replicate Emmons and McAdams’ (1991) 
findings. King (1995) failed to find direct relation-
ships between the TAT and a battery of other mo-
tive measures, including the PRF as well as strivings, 
reported wishes, and early memories coded us-
ing Winter’s (1991) running text system. This study 
also failed to find relationships between the PRF and 
strivings measures of power or affiliation motives. 
The lack of relationship between the PRF and TAT 
motives conformed well to Spangler’s (1992) finding 
of an average correlation between TAT and self-at-
tributed motives of r = .09 across 36 studies, which 
suggests that implicit and self-attributed motives are 
not independent, but are very nearly so. Although 
clearly more research needs to be done, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude from these studies that the de-
gree of commonality between implicit and explicit 
methods of assessing motives is not high. 
The controversy over implicit and self-attributed 
needs has fostered an environment in which very 
few researchers have combined motive measures 
with personality measures from the other three do-
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mains of personality (i.e., trait, ability, or narrative). 
In their attempt to integrate the domains of traits 
and motives, Winter et al. (1998) suggested that im-
plicit motives and personality traits generally inter-
act in their prediction of life outcomes. More spe-
cifically, they hypothesized that motives represent 
a person’s fundamental goals and desires, whereas 
traits channel the expression of these motives to-
ward specific paths. In looking at extraversion in 
combination with affiliation and power motivation 
in two samples of women, the authors found ex-
traverts preferred volunteer work, combined fam-
ily and work roles more frequently, and had more 
stable romantic relationships-but only if they were 
also high in affiliation motivation. Similarly, ex-
traverts rated work relationships as more impor-
tant than introverts, but only if they also were high 
in power motivation. In some cases, crossover in-
teractions were found, where extraverts had more 
satisfying relationships than introverts when both 
were high in affiliation motivation, but the reverse 
was true when both were low on the motive. Win-
ter and his colleagues had hypothesized this last in-
teraction by considering the introverted, low-af-
filiation individuals as most effective at working 
alone and unconcerned about the opinions of oth-
ers, whereas introverted high-affiliation individuals 
desired friendship and affection but were ineffec-
tive at maintaining it because of their awkwardness 
in interpersonal situations. It is interesting to note 
that for all of the life outcomes the authors investi-
gated, main effects between traits and motives were 
rare, and the importance of the constructs would be 
missed if considered separately. 
Although some studies exist examining the re-
lationship between different motive measures, we 
found surprisingly few studies that have looked at 
the simultaneous interplay of motive and other per-
sonality constructs in the prediction of other out-
comes. We suggest that not examining motives in 
combination with other domains results in a failure 
to fully understand the importance of motives, or 
worse, it may lead to erroneous conclusions about 
what motives are and do. For instance, early re-
search on achievement motivation was stymied for 
decades by the empirical finding of negative rela-
tionships between the motive and variables such as 
popularity (Boyatzis, 1973). Given the current theo-
rizing concerning trait-motive relationships, this can 
now be understood as a by-product of an achieve-
ment-extraversion interaction, which explains how 
extraverts and introverts differentially handle their 
level of achievement motivation (Winter et al., 1998). 
The domain of motives, much like the domain 
of traits, is marked by the use of distinct methods 
that do not converge as highly as one would like. 
In part, this divergence is consistent with the the-
oretical underpinnings of the two approaches. Re-
searchers who adopt the implicit motive approach 
are skeptical of cognitive appraisals of needs. In 
contrast, researchers who use the self-attributed 
approach find this less problematic. It is clear from 
the studies using these two approaches that they 
both bring independent complementary predictive 
variance to the research endeavor. Furthermore, 
when combined with methods and constructs from 
the trait domain, we find clear predictions of im-
portant life outcomes (Winter et al., 1998). 
Abilities 
Assessing intelligence has traditionally focused 
on multiple forms of test data (T data). Standard 
measures of intelligence typically attempt to gather 
information on a wide variety of traits considered 
to be at the core of general mental ability. How-
ever, numerous efforts have been made to move 
beyond traditional assessment approaches. These 
have included measures of specific cognitive abili-
ties, intellectual interests, and self-report measures 
of intelligence. 
Testing cognitive abilities has traditionally in-
cluded a variety of measurements and techniques, 
such as problem-solving tasks, assessments of 
school performance, information acquisition tasks, 
as well as matrix problems that require highly ab-
stract conditional discriminations. The reason for 
the success in tapping general cognitive abilities 
using a variety of techniques largely has to do with 
the degree to which general mental ability perme-
ates all learning, reasoning, and problem-solving 
abilities. Further, aggregations of measures of spa-
tial skills, verbal reasoning, and quantitative abili-
ties measure general mental ability more efficiently 
Us i n g MU l ti p l e Meth o d s i n pe R s o n al i ty ps y c h o l o g y  331
than aggregations of information items because the 
reasoning problems used in these measures typ-
ically capture a greater degree of common-factor 
variance associated with g (Gustafsson, 2002). Con-
sequently, the most popular measures of general 
mental ability include a variety of assessments de-
signed to tap several broad domains highly related 
to general mental ability, such as verbal, quantita-
tive, reasoning, and visuospatial skills. 
The search for alternative methods of measur-
ing general mental ability more purely has often 
led to the use of elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) 
that measure processing speed and working mem-
ory (Jensen, 1998). These tasks highlight the hier-
archical nature of intelligence and our earlier point 
that assessments across different levels of abstrac-
tion typically constitute related but different meth-
ods. ECTs have proved to be a popular alterna-
tive methodology for measuring general mental 
ability because such tasks avoid the bias that may 
be introduced in measurement by prior training 
and experience. It also is argued that basic cogni-
tive mechanisms underlie all thinking, reasoning, 
and decision-making processes, and therefore such 
mechanisms would be substantially related to gen-
eral mental ability (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). 
Interestingly, Carroll’s (1993) analysis of the 
structure of general mental ability showed that tasks 
measuring reaction time, inspection time, and dis-
crimination ability were only weakly related to gen-
eral mental ability. Indeed, early skepticism regard-
ing the efficacy of using such measures to measure 
general mental ability was the result of such mea-
sures being used in isolation. However, it has been 
demonstrated that scores on such experimental 
tasks can be aggregated to form a reasonable rep-
resentation of general mental ability if enough ex-
periments are carried out across a variety of cogni-
tive task domains (Green, 1978). It has been noted 
that correlations between combined reaction time 
scores from a number of ECTs and general mental 
ability approach the size typically seen with psycho-
metric power tests (Jensen, 1998). Further, the com-
bined scores from a number of ECTs can be used to 
predict upward of 70% of the heritable part of the 
variance in general mental ability For the purposes 
of experimentation, it should be noted that aggrega-
tions of ECTs form two general factors, perceptual 
speed and working memory (Ackerman, Beier, & 
Boyle, 2002). These factors are, as a result of aggre-
gation, both highly related to general mental abil-
ity, with working memory being the more highly re-
lated to g of the two (Ackerman et al., 2002). 
Another approach to measuring general mental 
ability has been to use self-reports of intelligence or 
intellectual engagement (Paulhus & Harms, 2004). 
This approach has been much maligned by intelli-
gence theorists because of the fact that self-report 
intelligence measures rarely exceed validities of .50 
with typical tests of maximal performance of cog-
nitive ability (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998). None-
theless, the search for better self-report measures 
has persisted because of the interest in finding a 
non-stressful and easily administered technique 
for obtaining performance information. 
One of the more comprehensive and successful 
self-report measures of intelligence has been the 
Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) scale devel-
oped by Goff and Ackerman (1992). The premise 
behind this scale is that knowledge is accumulated 
over time through effort and motivated engage-
ment in learning. It is therefore believed that this 
measure will better reflect daily behavior because 
it constitutes a test of typical intellectual perfor-
mance. This is distinguished from a test of maxi-
mal intellectual performance, such as an SAT test, 
where it can be assumed that the individual is 
bringing their full cognitive resources to bear to 
succeed and attain a better outcome. 
The TIE scale has been instrumental in integrat-
ing measures of the components of Ackerman’s 
PPIK theory, a multimethod approach to under-
standing intellectual functioning that integrates in-
telligence-as-process, personality, interest, and in-
telligence-as-knowledge (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 
1999). By assessing each of these domains, Rolf-
hus and Ackerman attempted to get a better ap-
proximation of the contribution of each to scores 
on knowledge and intelligence tests. Participants’ 
general mental ability was assessed using a com-
posite of verbal, mathematical, and spatial abil-
ities. Their personalities and interests were as-
sessed using standard measures of the Big Five 
personality traits, interests, and typical intellec-
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tual engagement. Subjects also completed a battery 
of tests measuring their knowledge in a wide va-
riety of domains including humanities, sciences, 
civics, and mechanics. This study demonstrated 
that a substantial higher-order Knowledge factor 
emerges from factor analysis of the knowledge do-
mains that accounts for approximately 50% of the 
variance in domain knowledge. Further analyses 
showed that this general factor was significantly 
correlated with crystallized intelligence, which 
was represented by a composite of verbal ability 
tests. This suggests that the general knowledge fac-
tor is highly related, but not identical, to crystal-
lized intelligence. These findings also suggest that 
a substantial part of the variance in knowledge test 
performance remains to be predicted by more do-
main-specific influences, such as interests and per-
sonality. For instance, Extraversion was shown to 
be negatively related to all but one of the domain 
knowledge tests, with Openness to Experience and 
Typical Intellectual Engagement also demonstrat-
ing significant, positive relationships across the 
knowledge domains. Measures of interests also 
proved to be related to domain knowledge scores, 
but were more specific with regard to matching 
content domains. Realistic interests were related 
to mechanical knowledge domains, Investigative 
interests were mostly related to science domains, 
and Artistic interests were most highly related to 
knowledge domains that reflected the humanities. 
Like the domain of motives, one finds that com-
bining tests of cognitive ability with measures 
taken from other domains, and thus other meth-
ods, maximizes our ability to predict important 
outcomes. One of the best multimethod studies 
that integrated multiple measures of intelligence, 
knowledge, interests, and personality measures 
to real-world performance outcomes was Project 
A (Campbell, 1985). Borman, White, Pulakos, and 
Oppler (1991) analyzed data from 4,362 first-term 
soldiers in nine U.S. Army jobs. Subjects were as-
sessed for cognitive ability using the ASVAB, as 
well as job knowledge, dependability, and achieve-
ment orientation measures that were developed for 
the study. To assess performance, hands-on pro-
ficiency measures and supervisory ratings were 
taken, and the number of disciplinary actions and 
awards received were recorded. Path modeling 
demonstrated that although achievement orien-
tation and dependability made independent, al-
though small, contributions to supervisory ratings, 
the impact of general mental ability on supervisory 
ratings of job performance was completely medi-
ated by job knowledge, which in turn was medi-
ated by task proficiency. Further, dependability 
was positively related to job knowledge and nega-
tively related to disciplinary actions. Achievement 
orientation was positively related to the number 
of awards a soldier received. The model demon-
strated by this analysis shows that although gen-
eral mental ability has a huge impact on job knowl-
edge, and job knowledge is substantially related to 
task proficiency, it is by no means the largest of the 
contributors to job performance ratings by super-
visors. Personality factors and outcomes associated 
with personality factors also make significant di-
rect contributions to supervisory ratings. 
There are many different approaches to the study 
and measurement of general mental ability. The 
most successful approaches, and consequently the 
most widely used, have used measures from across 
content domains to gain a fuller representation of 
the cognitive functioning required in reasoning, de-
cision making, and other thought processes. Alter-
native approaches such as information processing 
techniques using elementary cognitive tasks have 
proved to be successful as indicators of general 
mental ability, but only when they are assessed and 
aggregated across modalities, content &mains, and 
tasks. Other alternatives, such as self-report mea-
sures of intelligence and intellectual interest, have 
shown promise as indicators of general mental abil-
ity, but may be best suited to offering a more inte-
grated picture of how basic brain processes, work-
ing memory, and personality may be related to 
real-world outcomes in intellectual functioning. 
Life Story Narrative as a Means of Investigating 
Personality 
Like the first three domains of personality, the 
use of narrative methods in multimethod research 
is a novel occurrence, yet has thus far been infor-
mative to the understanding of individual differ-
ences. Qualitative assessments of personality be-
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gin at the most basic level with the case study and 
progress to rigorously assessed structured inter-
views (McAdams, 1996, 1999). Qualitative data 
is frequently gathered in the form of open-ended 
questions concerning a topic of interest to the re-
searcher. Consistent with the perspective that each 
domain of personality is arranged hierarchically, 
qualitative data can be examined at both the micro- 
and macrolevels. Microlevel assessment is con-
cerned with specific linguistic patterns within the 
narrative such as pronoun usage or specific word 
type frequencies (e.g., Pennebaker & Francis, 1996). 
In contrast, macrolevel assessment focuses on the 
broad themes throughout a narrative, such as re-
demption sequences (McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, 
Patten, & Bowman, 2001). Such thematic coding 
is often developed by the researchers after 1 lis-
tening to interviews or reading written narratives. 
Trained coders can then rate each qualitative da-
tum on the varying themes of interest. Topics that 
are open to narrative methods are limited only by 
the creativity and ambition of the researcher, and 
the richness of the data can afford multiple oppor-
tunities to better understand the personality of an 
individual. For example, McAdams’ life story in-
terview (McAdams, 1996, 1999) asks people to de-
scribe low points, turning points, and religious be-
liefs among other experiences. Each of these stories 
can be examined individually for specific types of 
experiences (e.g., questioning of parents’ religious 
beliefs, difficult times) to broad life-span themes, 
such as agency and communion. Qualitative data 
can thus be converted into data that is quantita-
tively assessable without losing the nuances of the 
qualitative form. Additionally, excerpts from qual-
itative data may be used to reiterate a theoreti-
cal point. Examples from three studies will help 
to illuminate these methodologies. A substantial 
amount of narrative research concerns the reaction 
of an individual to difficult life events in his or her 
life. Theoretically, the manner in which an individ-
ual responds to traumatic experiences that threaten 
his or her view of self and the surrounding world 
is critical for understanding the identity of that in-
dividual. If an individual is able to construct a co-
herent self from a difficult life event, he or she is 
considered to have a healthy identity. 
A recent multimethod study provides a clear ex-
ample of the utility of the narrative approach. Par-
ents of children with Down syndrome were con-
tacted through a support group mailing list as well 
as through area hospitals (King, Scollon, Ramsey, 
& Williams, 2000). The parents were initially asked 
self-report questions concerning well-being, ad-
ministered a projective test of ego development, 
and asked to write a story about when they were 
first told that their child had Down syndrome. Two 
years after the initial assessment, parents again re-
sponded to self-report measures of well-being and 
a projective measure of ego development. The nar-
ratives were assessed by three independent raters 
for themes of accommodation (exploration, shifts 
in perspective, activity) and closed (denial, neg-
ative affect). Parents who were low in ego devel-
opment at Time 1 who wrote in an accommodative 
manner demonstrated increased ego development 
2 years later. Parents who wrote narratives in both 
an accommodative and closure style had higher 
feelings of stress-related growth at the 2-year fol-
low-up. This research provides an example of how 
healthy processing (i.e., exploring the impact of the 
event on the self and discovering a positive resolu-
tion about this experience) of difficult events on an 
individual level allows for healthier, more mature 
functioning later in life (King et al., 2000). 
Helson (1992) examined more general identity 
threatening events in the writing of women’s dif-
ficult life experiences in an ongoing, multimethod 
longitudinal study. Information was gathered 
about the age at which women experienced diffi-
cult, identity-changing life events and various per-
sonality factors that influenced the onset of such 
experiences. In addition, information about iden-
tity status (achieved, moratorium, foreclosed, and 
diffuse) was used to understand the meaning and 
effect of difficult times. Women who had a diffuse 
identity presented more themes related to nega-
tive evaluations of themselves. Foreclosed women 
wrote mainly about having bad partners or over-
load. Achieved/moratorium women wrote primar-
ily about becoming psychologically independent 
and its consequences. Additionally, as women’s 
vulnerability began to decrease and confidence be-
gan to increase on personality measures around 30 
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years of age, an increase in identity themes occurs. 
This research suggests that the rewriting of the life 
story occurs in middle age for women, and that 
this is associated with an increased importance of 
independence, which is in turn related to healthy 
identity functioning. 
Pals (2005) combined the narratives of the 
women in the Mills study with themes parallel to 
those of King et al. (2000) to illustrate not only the 
correlation between personality on the trait level 
and narrative level, but also the dynamic interac-
tive processes of trait and narrative conceptual-
izations of personality Narratives from women 
who had participated in the longitudinal study 
described earlier (Helson, 1992) were coded for 
themes of resolution (overall resolution, positive 
ending, low negative ending, low lasting wounds, 
coherent ending) and impact on self (open re-
sponse, narrative complexity, low self-distancing, 
acknowledged wounds, positive self-transforma-
tion, and active approach). These two dimensions 
were then used in conjunction with age 21 and age 
52 responses to personality measures of open ver-
sus defensive coping (a combination of tolerance of 
ambiguity and reverse scored repression) and ego-
resiliency to predict physical and psychological 
health outcomes at age 61. Findings demonstrated 
that whereas coping openness at age 21 was related 
to clinician-rated maturity at age 61, this relation 
was mediated by the extent to which women com-
posed a narrative that was open to expressing the 
impact of the negative events on the self. Further, 
whereas a resolved narrative was related to sub-
jective well-being at age 61, this effect was medi-
ated by ego resiliency at ages 21 and 52, suggesting 
a dynamic interaction of trait and narrative person-
ality in relation to healthy functioning. 
Qualitative research provides the researcher 
with an ability to not only examine the individ-
ual, but also the world in which the individual ex-
ists and the events that precipitate change in the 
individual, thus providing a complex and invalu-
able source of data for understanding the person 
as a whole. Used in combination with other meth-
ods, it is clear that narrative data can not only add 
a deeper, more complex understanding of basic 
psychological phenomena, but also account for im-
portant variance in addition to standard methods, 
such as self-reported personality traits. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from our review that the field of per-
sonality psychology is intrinsically a multimethod 
field. Within and across each domain of personal-
ity, methods as diverse as self-reports, observer rat-
ings, projective tests, test of maximal performance, 
and qualitative interpretations of narratives are 
brought to bear on understanding individual dif-
ferences in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Con-
sistent with our neosocioanalytic framework, many 
of the methods correlate quite strongly with con-
tent. Self-reports and observer ratings tend to be 
used more often in the assessment of personality 
traits, and the complement of hierarchically related 
constructs such as affect and behavior. The use of 
projective tests bridges domains, but is primarily 
located in the assessment of motives. Tests of max-
imal performance have the potential to bridge do-
mains, but are similarly found almost entirely in the 
content domain of abilities. Finally, one’s story is al-
most exclusively the domain of methods that fo-
cus on life data. Moreover, within each domain re-
searchers are beginning to use multiple methods to 
assess the hierarchically related constructs within 
a content category, such as when broad trait mea-
sures are combined with the assessment of daily 
mood or behavior (e.g., Wirtz et al., 2003). 
Despite the impressive methodological plurality 
across and within domains in personality psychol-
ogy, there remains a tremendous unrealized poten-
tial to bring multiple methods to bear on relevant 
topics. For example, the use of test data in domains 
other than abilities remains untapped, despite pro-
vocative studies pointing to the potential to assess 
personality traits in ways other than asking some-
one to rate themselves on a personality inventory. 
Experimental tests, such as the “go, no-go” task in 
which people are told to inhibit a response to a cue 
when a stop signal tone is emitted have system-
atic relationships to personality traits such as im-
pulse control (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997) 
and related forms of psychopathology, such as de-
linquency (Mezzacappa, Kindlon, & Earls, 2001). 
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The interesting question that is as yet untested is 
whether tests like these can be aggregated into a 
reliable index of individual differences in person-
ality traits, just as the elementary cognitive tasks 
have been aggregated to tap into cognitive ability. 
Despite the examples cited earlier, it remains 
anomalous for researchers to use more than one 
method to investigate almost any phenomena in 
personality psychology. Too much time and effort 
have gone into reifying one or another technique as 
the gold standard method for assessing construct 
such as traits (e.g., Hofstee, 1994) or motives (Mc-
Clelland et al., 1989). Also, there is a tendency to 
approach method variance as if it is uninteresting 
and an expectation that it should not play a role 
in the type of information gleaned from an assess-
ment (cf. Ozer, 1986). This somewhat disrespectful 
approach to multiple methods quite possibly de-
rives from the article that inspired this book (e.g., 
Cronbach & Gleser, 1953), in which the construct of 
interest is supposed to supersede the method and 
therefore converge in a robust fashion across di-
verse techniques of assessment. In contrast, more 
realistic appraisals of the information taken from 
multiple methods point to a more sobering con-
clusion that the information acquired from mul-
tiple methods may in fact be more independent 
than previously expected (Fiske, 1971; Meyer et al., 
2001; Ozer, 1986). Therefore, different methods of 
assessment provide complementary information 
rather than perfectly overlapping information. This 
only reinforces the point that researchers should 
use multiple methods in personality psychology by 
default to arrive at a more complete understanding 
of their research interests, whether it is traits, mo-
tives, abilities, or life narratives.
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